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Salfrank: Salfrank: Fraser Balancing Test

NOTES

THE FRASER BALANCING TEST:
LEAVING COHEN'S JACKET AT
THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE
Bethel School District v. Fraser'
In Bethel School District v. Fraser,2 the United States Supreme Court
was presented the challenge of determining proper limitations on students'
constitutional rights at school. The specific question addressed by the Court
was whether a student possessed the comprehensive freedom to employ
offensive language in expressing his opinions on school premises.' The answer, clearly, was no. 4 The Fraser decision holds that a student does not
necessarily enjoy first amendment protection when speaking in an indecent
manner within the confines of the school building. At least under certain
circumstances, offensive modes of expression by students may be justifiably
regulated and punished by school officials.5
In reaching this determination, the Supreme Court looked to the un6
derlying principles of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District
and Cohen v. California.7 In those decisions, the Court utilized a balancing
test to determine first amendment protection of controversial language. The
Court weighed the speaker's interests in conveying the message against the
State's interests in regulating that conveyance.' In both Tinker and Cohen,
the balance tipped in favor of the speaker. 9
In Tinker, the Supreme Court declared that students did not "shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 3164.
Id.
Id. at 3166.
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
403 U.S. 15, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18, 22-23.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27.
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house gate." 0 Students could freely express controversial and political viewpoints without fear of punishment. 1 Only when the speech disrupted the
2
educational objectives of the school could sanctions be imposed.'
Later, in Cohen, the Court upheld an individual's right to express
political viewpoints through vulgar and offensive language. The use of lewd
expressions in voicing dissident opinions was constitutionally protected. 3
4
Absent public disturbance, the language was permissible.
In delivering the Fraseropinion, Chief Justice Burger clearly indicates
that the rationale of Cohen is inappropriate in a high school setting. 5 As
a result, a limitation is placed on the first amendment rights afforded
students in Tinker. A student clearly retains the freedom to voice dissident
opinions in school, but now he may be regulated in the choice of language
16
used to convey that message.
In reaching this conclusion, the FraserCourt utilized a balancing process similar to those used in Tinker and Cohen. 7 The distinctive outcome
in Fraser came about through the Court's determination that, under the
facts of the case, the State's interests superceded those of the orator. 8
However, the resulting boundary line between appropriate and inappropriate student language appears to be the consequence of more than just
the distinguishable fact situations between Fraserand previous decisions.
Rather, the distinction seems to lie in a shift of emphasis that the Court
places on one scale of the balancing mechanism. That is, in cases involving
indecent student language in schools, the Court appears to have redefined
the scope of the State interests against which the speaker's interest must
be weighed. In so doing, the focus of the disruptive test is now centered
more closely on the teaching of societal values rather than the maintenance
of classroom order.' 9 The ultimate impact of this shift in the Court's attention is unclear; just as in Tinker2" and Cohen,2' the door has been left
22
open to future refinements and courtroom battles.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
Id. at 511.
Id. at 513.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
Id.
106 S.Ct. at 3164.
Id. at'3165.
See id. at 3164.
Id. at 3165-66.
Id. at 3164.
See infra notes 34-41, 60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
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In Tinker, three students wore black armbands to class to publicize
their objections to the Vietnam War. 23 They chose to do so despite a newly
adopted school regulation specifically prohibiting the activity. 24 All three
were suspended until they agreed to comply with the regulation. The Supreme Court held that the disciplinary actions taken by the school officials
violated the students' first amendment rights. 25
The Tinker decision was based on a balancing test. 26 The Court examined the students' rights guaranteed under the first and fourteenth
amendments. Weighed against those rights was the State's interest in maintaining control in the classroom. 27
Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, stressed that "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment, [were] available to teachers and students. ' 28 A student was
not limited to voicing only those opinions which were pre-approved by
school officials. He could not be prohibited from expressing his feelings
solely because they involved issues with which school officials did not wish
to contend. 29
Also compelling, however, was the State's need to regulate student
conduct to insure an orderly academic environment. Great deference was
afforded the authority of school officials "to prescribe and control conduct
'30
in the schools."
The Court ultimately held that a student had the right to express his
opinion so long as the speech did not "materially and substantially" in23. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969). The Court held that wearing the armbands constituted a symbolic act illustrating a political viewpoint which was protected by the free speech clause of
the first amendment. Id.
24. Id. After learning of the demonstration, school officials initiated a policy which mandated that a student donning an armband would first be asked to
remove it. If the request was refused, the student would be suspended until he
agreed to conform with the regulation. Id.
25. Id. at 514.
26. Id. at 507; see Note, Tinker Revisited: Fraser v. Bethel School District
and Regulation of Speech in the Public Schools, 1985 DuKE L.J. 1164, 1166 &
n.24, 1176 & n.92, 1188 & n.165.
27. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507.
28. Id. at 506; see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960) (failure
to renew teachers' contracts for refusing to file a listing of every organization to
which they belonged or contributed held unconstitutional).
29. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511. See generally West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (expulsion of student who refused to salute the
American flag for religious reasons held unconstitutional).
30. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507; see Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d
803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971) (in spite of the desire to encourage students to become
involved in social comment and debate, the state ultimately has the authority "to
minimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or disrupt the effectiveness of
the educational process").
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terfere with the discipline and operation of the school or collide with the
rights of others2 The regulation of student speech was to occur only if
there were sufficient facts which would reasonably lead school officials to
"forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school
activities." 3 2 The majority concluded that "[i]n the absence of a specific
showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their speech, students
[were] entitled to freedom of expression of their views." 33
The Tinker decision left a number of questions unanswered, 4 one of
which was addressed in Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. Stewart felt
that the majority implied that a student's first amendment rights were
36
3
synonymous with those enjoyed by adults. Citing Ginsberg v. New York,
he stressed that "[a] State may permissibly determine that, at least in some
precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is
not possessed of that full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." 3 7 The obvious implication of
his concurrence was that children in the classroom could justifiably be
prohibited from voicing their opinions to an even greater extent than the
majority suggested.38 In his dissent, Justice Black suggested that the scope
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503, 513
(1969).
32. Id. at 514.
33. Id. at 511. The Tinker decision clearly indicates that student speech may
be regulated under appropriate circumstances. School officials bear the burden,
though, of showing that the restrictions are necessary under those circumstances.
The value of the Tinker decision came with "its implicit message that school officials
[could not] arbitrarily, unreasonably, and without sufficient justification, curtail
students' rights of free expression." Note, Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate:Protecting
the Off-Campus First Amendment Freedoms of Students, 59 NEB. L. REv. 790,
794 (1980).
34. See Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case
Against Judicial,Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477, 483 (1981); Comment, The
Supreme Court and the Decline of Students' Constitutional Rights: A Selective
Analysis, 65 NEB. L. REv. 161, 165-66 (1986).
35. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring).
36. 390 U.S. 629, reh'g denied, 391 U.S. 971 (1968). In Ginsberg, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a state statute which prohibited the
sale of "girlie" magazines to minors. These same magazines were deemed not to
be obscene for adults and were therefore within the realm of first amendment
protection. Id. at 634-35. In support of the finding that a state could justifiably
adjust the definition of obscenity with regard to minors, the Court held that "even
where there is an invasion of protected freedoms 'the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults. . .
Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
37. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (quoting Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 649-50) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
38. The extent to which the Tinker rationale protected the rights of students
and teachers was tested in a flood of litigation. See, e.g., Shanley v. Northeast
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of Tinker was overly broad. 9 Black felt the majority opinion served only
to encourage the myth that a child could say "what he pleases, where he
pleases, and when he pleases." 4 The State had a valid interest in regulating
conduct which distracted from the school's educational purposes. Prohibiting speech which caused such diversions was, according to Black, consis4
tent with the first amendment. '
Two years after the Tinker decision, in Cohen, an individual's right
42
to employ profanity in expressing political viewpoints was established.
Cohen was arrested in a county courthouse while wearing a jacket bearing
explicit sexual language. 43 Although no hostile reactions or other disruptions
occurred in response to the message, Cohen was charged with disturbing
the peace through use of offensive conduct. He was convicted and sentenced
to thirty days imprisonment.Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972) (court of appeals found unconstitutional a school board practice of punishing students for publishing and distributing "underground" newspapers while off school property and during out-ofschool hours); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971) (court
held that a school policy which prohibited students from distributing printed material was unconstitutional); Butts v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 436 F.2d 728 (5th
Cir. 1971) (court of appeals held that, as school environment was not disrupted,
students wearing black armbands were improperly disciplined for expressing their
opposition to the Vietnam War); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.
1970) (en banc) (appellate court found that the sale of student newspapers, which
included sexually explicit phrases and critiques of school administrators, did not
bring about substantial disruption with school activities; therefore, the expulsion
of students selling the paper was unconstitutional), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970); Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450 (E.D. Mo. 1985)
(trial court found that students' first amendment rights had not been violated when
school officials refused to allow controversial articles to appear in school newspaper), rev'd, 795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387
(D. Mass. 1971) (secondary school teacher was found to have been deprived of his
constitutional rights when suspended for utilizing a nontraditional teaching method
which included the use of a four-letter word), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971);
see also Egner v. Texas Indep. School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 526 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black asserted
that he wished no part in a holding which "compels teachers, parents, and elected
school officials to surrender control of the American public school system to public
school students." Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
40. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black stated:
"While I have always believed that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
neither the State nor the Federal Government has any authority to regulate or censor
the content of speech, I have never believed that any person has a right to give
speeches or engage in demonstrations where he pleases and when he pleases." Id.
at 517 (Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting).
42. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
43. Id. at 16. Cohen's jacket bore the words "Fuck the Draft."
44. Id. Cohen's conviction was based on the violation of section 415 of the
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The Supreme Court held that Cohen's conviction violated his right of
free expression. 45 Speaking for the Court, Justice Harlan recognized that
the Constitution did not protect every form of expression in all situations, 46
but the Court held that the mere presence of unwilling or unsuspecting
"listeners" did not automatically justify the prohibition of all speech capable of offending its audience. 47 Speech, albeit offensive, could not be
curtailed absent a showing that "substantial privacy rights [of bystanders
were] being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner."'' 4 In finding no
such invasion of rights, the Court focused on the element of choice available
to Cohen's audience. The Court stressed that "[tihose in the ...courthouse
could effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply
by averting their eyes." ' 49 Those unable to avoid brief exposure to the
message, on the other hand, were free to express their objections to the
''speaker." 5 0

The Court also employed a balancing test in reaching their decision.
An individual's freedom to express his opinions was balanced against the
State's need to regulate public conduct to maintain order. On one hand,
the right to voice dissident political viewpoints was to be "protected from
arbitrary governmental interference." 5 On the other, the State's interest in
prohibiting certain forms of expression was based on the need to avoid
violent reaction to controversial messages.5 2 The Court held that the mere
apprehension of a disturbance did not overcome an individual's right to
53
voice his opinions.
California Penal Code which prohibited, in part, "maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person ... by offensive conduct." CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1970).
45. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
46. Id. at 19; see, e.g., Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363
F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) ("The Constitution does not confer 'unrestricted and
unbridled license giving immunity for every possible use of language and preventing
the punishment of those who abuse this freedom."' Id. at 754 (quoting Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927))).
47. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 22.
51. Id. at 19. The Court stated that it could not "indulge the facile assumption that one [could] forbid particular words without also running a substantial
risk of suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon
the censorship of particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression
of unpopular views." Id. at 26.
52. Id. at 22-23.
53. Id. at 23 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)). The Court noted: "At least so long as there is no showing of an
intent to incite disobedience to or disruption of the draft, Cohen could not, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, be punished for asserting the
evident position on the inutility or immorality of the draft his jacket reflected."
Id. at 18.
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Moreover, the prohibition of language on the grounds of vulgarity was
arbitrary at best.14 In reversing Cohen's conviction, the Court made it clear
that "the State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it
is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us." '55
The Cohen Court was sharply divided. Justice Blackmun's dissenting
opinion suggested that prior decisions were directly at odds with the majority ruling. 56 Blackmun, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Black joined, believed that Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire7 governed the
Cohen situation. In Chaplinsky, the prohibition of obscenities in public
was upheld. Obscene utterances were deemed as having "such slight value
as a step to the truth that any benefit that may be derived from them [was]
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 58 Using
this rationale, Blackmun characterized the Cohen Court's "agonizing over
' 59
First Amendment rights" as "misplaced and unnecessary.
The problem which faced the lower courts following the Tinker and
Cohen decisions came with the merging of the two fact situations. A number
of cases moved to the dockets concerning vulgarity or "immoral messages"
being conveyed in the presence of children at school. 60 It was not until
54. Id. at 25 (noting that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
55. Id. The rationale of the Court in Cohen was consistent with the underlying policy of the Tinker decision. In Tinker, the Court held that state regulation
of speech was to be based on "something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint."
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
56. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
58. Id. at 572.
59. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60. E.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. v. Pico,
457 U.S. 853 (1982) (school officials violated students' constitutional rights when
they removed "immoral" books from the library with the intent to "prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."
Id. at 854 (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642
(1943))); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1981) (school officials did not
violate students' first amendment rights when they cancelled a school sponsored
play due to sexual content); Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent. School
Dist., 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980) (students
responsible for the writing and distribution of a newspaper which was deemed
"morally offensive, indecent, and obscene" by school officials, were wrongly punished since all but insignificant occurrences took place off school property and after
school hours); see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Although not dealing with indecent language in a school setting, the Court in
Pacifica made it clear that prohibition of offensive language did not violate the
speaker's constitutional rights when there was a "reasonable risk that children may
be in the audience." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732. The Court distinguished Cohen on
the basis that Pacifica dealt with vulgar language communicated over the radio,
while the Cohen communication was in writing. According to the Court's reasoning,
a child may not have been able to read the message on the jacket, but "Pacifica's
broadcast could have enlarged a child's vocabulary in an instant." Id. at 749.
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Fraser, though, that the Supreme Court stepped in to determine the effect
of the Cohen standard on the first amendment protection afforded students
in Tinker.
The dispute in Fraser arose when a high school senior delivered a
sexually explicit speech at an assembly.61 The assembly was attended by
approximately 600 high school students. 62 A graphic metaphor, "glorifying
male sexuality," ' 63 was employed by Fraser in nominating a fellow classmate
for student office. 64 Student reaction to the speech included embarrassment,
hoots and yells, and gestures simulating the sexual activities to which the
speaker alluded. 65 The following day, Fraser was suspended. 66 This action
was based on the violation of a disciplinary rule which read: "Conduct
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process
67
is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures."
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals utilized the Tinker balancing test
in deciding the Frasercase. 68 The focus of their decision centered on the
minimal amount of physical outbursts or other student reaction in response
to the metaphor. 69 The administration, the court noted, "had no difficulty
in maintaining order during the assembly." 7 0 Therefore, the appellate court
concluded that Fraser was indistinguishable from Tinker on the issue of
disruption. 71 In finding for Fraser, the court held that "a noisy response

61. Fraser, 106 S.Ct. at 3162. The text of Fraser's speech follows: "I know
a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm. Jeff
Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take
an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he drives
hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go
to the very end - even the climax, for each and every one of you. So vote for
Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come between you and the best our
high school can be." Id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Brief for
Appellant at 47).
62. Id. at 3162.
63. Id. at 3165.
64. Id. at 3162.
65. Id. After the assembly, one teacher found it necessary to devote a portion of the class period to discuss the speech with her students. Id.
66. Id. Fraser served two days of a three day suspension. He was permitted
to return to class on the third day. Id. at 3163. In addition to the suspension,
Fraser's name was removed from the list of candidates for speaker at the graduation
ceremonies. Despite the omission of his name from that list, Fraser won the election
for graduation speaker through write-in votes. Following the district court's decision
in Fraser's favor, Fraser delivered the graduation address on June 8, 1983. Id.
67. Id.
68. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1358 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd,
106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986).
69. Id. at 1359-60.
70. Id. at 1360.
71. Id.
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to the speech and sexually suggestive movements by three students in a
crowd of 600 fail to rise to the level of material interference with the
educational process that justifies impinging on Fraser's first amendment
'72
right to express himself freely."
The Supreme Court, critical of the appellate court decision, held that
the disciplinary action taken by school officials did not violate Fraser's
first amendment rights. 73 Chief Justice Burger reaffirmed that students enjoyed constitutional protection in school. This protection, however, was
maintained only so long as the speech does not interfere with "the work
of the schools or the rights of other students." 74
A "marked distinction" was drawn between the political message conveyed by Tinker's armband and the lewd content of Fraser's speech. 7 Tinker's demonstration was described by the Court as a "nondisruptive" and
"passive" political message.7 6 Alternatively, Fraser was characterized as a
"confused boy" using indecent and insulting language which interfered with
the basic instruction of community values. School officials did not have to
77
tolerate the latter.
The Court proceeded to distinguish Fraser from Cohen as well. The
constitutional rights of a public school student were deemed not necessarily
"coextensive" with those of an adult in different surroundings. 78 The Court
held that "[i]t does not follow ... . that simply because the use of an
offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults ... that the
' 79
same latitude be permitted to children in the public school.
Again the Court utilized a balancing test in reaching its conclusion.
The standard adopted in Fraserdictates that "[t]he undoubted freedom to
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms must
be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching students
the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior."8 0
Two overriding State interests were delineated by the Court. First, the
necessary instruction of mature and civil conduct could not survive in an
institution infested with indecent speech and conduct. 8' The use of vulgar
72. Id.
73. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
74. Id. at 3163 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 508 (1969)).
75. Id. at 3163.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 3165-66.
78. Id. at 3164 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 3165.
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language was deemed inherently inconsistent with the "fundamental values" 8 2
of public school education.83 Second, the State had a basic interest in "protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language." 8 4
State imposed limitations on the speaker's rights were justified when his
sexually explicit message was directed at an audience of children.85
In essence, the Court held that the Constitution did not prohibit the
State from determining that certain forms of expression, including indecent
language, were unsuitable within the school.8 6 As such, the function of
school officials clearly encompassed the reasonable regulation of student
speech. The imposition of punishment in response to a student's inappropriately lewd mode of expression was well within the scope of their authority.8 7 To hold otherwise, the Court reasoned, would surely "undermine
the school's basic educational mission." 88
The emphasis which the Court places on this newly defined educational
mission is the focal point of the Frasertest.8 9 The creation of this standard
appears to come about with the Court's realization that, where indecent
language is employed by a student on school premises, neither the Tinker
nor the Cohen standard is adequate.90 In this situation, the State's interest,
against which the speaker's interest must be weighed, must clearly be more
complicated than merely maintaining order. 9' Therefore, the differentiated
facts of the Frasercase seem to have brought with them an individualized
perspective from which to view the State's objectives and interests. Where,
82. In Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.. 68 (1979), the Court held that public
schools play a vital role in the "preparation of individuals for participation as
citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests .... " Id.
at 76. The Court further stated that one goal of public school education was the
"inculcat[ion of] fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic
political system. . . " Id. at 77. This principle was echoed by the Frasermajority.
Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
83. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165-66. The Court held that it was, in fact, the
function of the public school to prohibit the use of offensive language and that
role was logically compatible with the teaching of the "values of a civilized social
order." Id. at 3165; see also Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools:
Tinker Distinguished, 59 GEo. L.J. 37, 56 (1970).
84. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165. See generally Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d
214, 220 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J., concurring).
85. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165; see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
757 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
86. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3165; see Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville
Cent. School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1055 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980).
87. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 3165-66.
90. Id. at 3163-64.
91. Id.
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prior to Fraser, the Court had repeatedly delineated the primary interest
as the need to maintain control, 92 the focus of the Fraserstandard shifts
the emphasis placed on the State's objectives to include the maintenance
of proper societal values. 93 Under the Fraser test, then, indecent student
language which provokes a substantial disruption of the teaching of these
94
values would justify State regulation of the speech.
The Fraser test does not appear to be in conflict with the Tinker or
Cohen decisions. Rather, it seems that all three standards will co-exist, each
to be utilized in the particular fact situations under which they arose. It
appears, then, that the Cohen test will be applicable in deciding appropriate
limitations on the use of vulgar language by adults. By the same token,
Tinker will be utilized by the courts in determining proper regulation of
purely political or otherwise inoffensive student speech. The Fraserdecision
will be the guidepost in situations where vulgar student speech is regulated
by school officials.
The question remains, however, whether the Frasertest will act as a
comprehensive ban on indecent language within the school setting.9 5 Although the ultimate message relayed by the FraserCourt is that a student
can "wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket," 96 it is unclear whether
the jacket must remain at the schoolhouse gate throughout the entire day.
For example, the door is left open as to the prohibition of indecent language
in situations where children do not comprise a captive audience. 97 Restrictions may or may not be permissible when the message is relayed on the
playing field, in the principal's office, or in casual conversation between
students. 98
Justice Stevens touched on this matter in his dissenting opinion. He
stated that it was "fairly obvious that [Fraser's] speech would be inappropriate in certain classroom and formal social settings. On the other hand,
in a locker room or perhaps in a school corridor the metaphor in the speech
92.
Cohen v.
93.
94.

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969);
California, 403 U.S. 15, 18, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
Id. at 3165-66.

95. Id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 3164-65 (quoting Thomas v. Board of Educ., Granville Cent.

School Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1980)).

97. Id. at 3165. The Court noted that school authorities could protect children, "especially in a captive audience," from exposure to lewd speech. Id. An
implication may therefore be drawn that children may not be deemed a captive
audience at all times while on school property. Cf. Egner v. Texas City Indep.
School Dist., 338 F. Supp. 931, 944 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (since children are compelled
to attend school, they comprise a captive audience during the entire school day).
98. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3167-68 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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might be regarded as rather routine comment." 99 Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment, also recognized this issue. He stated that Fraser's
speech "may well have been protected had he given it in school but under
different circumstances, where the school's legitimate interests in teaching
and maintaining civil public discourse were less weighty.""
The Fraser decision draws no bright lines to distinguish the specific
time, place or manner' 0' that State interests outweigh those of the student.
It does seem clear that the Court will continue the trend of balancing a
student's interests against those of the State to ascertain where these boundaries lie. That balancing process will determine whether upcoming litigation
will result in the expansion or continued restriction of student speech in
public schools.
LINDA J. SALFRANK

99. Id. at 3171 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 3168 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101. Id.; see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
513, 517, 522 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
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